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Evidence is provided of the effects of international diversification on global
asset ownership and control. We show that international geographic di-
versification in the oil and gas sector comes at an important cost, lower
control over foreign oilfield assets relative to domestic assets (and therefore
reduced control over oilfield cash-flows). This work examines this contradic-
tion. Detailed worldwide oilfield ownership data for 293 companies owning
6,633 field stakes enables us to isolate variables underpinning asset own-
ership, demonstrating that international diversification increases with firm
size, but is negatively related to asset control. We argue that companies
seeking reserve replacement are forced to diversify and therefore need to be
prepared to obtain lower control over oilfield cashflow. We find an important
caveat; companies retain minimum blockholding in foreign investments.
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I Introduction
Our study addresses the effect of global oil and gas diversification on asset control,
adding contrary insights into the value of blockholdings in the most important global
extractive industry, oil and gas (O&G). We find that geographic diversification leads
to diminishing control over asset cash flows, leading to an implied but clear cost to
international diversification strategies. Our O&G findings contrast with those for the
tobacco industry by Beneish et al. (2008) who document that diversifying acquisitions
by tobacco firms are positive net present value (NPV) investments, and that wealth
creation increases with the degree of domestic geographic expansion, apparently this
occurs as a result of increasing tobacco firms’ influence in political districts. Rose (1996)
also studies geographic diversification and the cost effects of interstate banking in the
US. He finds that when banking firms are grouped into different levels of geographic
diversification, highly diversified interstate banks appear to achieve reductions in risk
exposure, operating costs and therefore benefit from geographic diversification.
The existing body of literature infers that stock blockholders are able under cer-
tain circumstances, to exercise undue influence over cash flows. The result is that
corporate blockholdings come at a control premium. Interestingly for listed corpo-
rates these blockholdings typically comprise between 5-10% of shares (see Holderness
(2007)). Prior research has also made the point that blockholding value occurs partic-
ularly where minorities are not protected (see Durnev and Kim (2007) for a discussion
of minority investor protection).
In O&G we see no such benefits; global diversification in the O&G industry increases
political risk, particularly for OECD producers. Cross border cost reductions are diffi-
cult to achieve and complex to analyze in that they combine technical field risks and
fiscal regimes, both of which vary by jurisdiction. Simply put, we suggest that despite
reasons, which have previously supported expansion, in O&G these are reasons not to
diversify. So, why then do O&G companies diversify? The simple answer seems to be
that they have to in order to replace reserves. But, our contribution is that we suggest
that for the O&G industry this comes at an important implied cost, reduced control
over foreign assets.
O&G industry assets are unique in that they are, in the main, held in Joint Assets
No Entities (JANEs). In these JANEs, the majority or dominant stakeholder is able
to exercise control over the development strategy of the oilfield asset. The majority
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holder is therefore able to maximize corporate value - control and optimize cash flows.
Oilfield NPV behavior is therefore uniquely asset based and controlled by majority or
controlling asset stakeholders. It is, for example, precisely this control principle that is
at the heart of the TNK-BP dispute, where BP and TNK each hold 50% of the venture,
resulting in a strategic stalemate for the asset development. In O&G, minorities are
exactly that - minorities with secondary influence over asset cash flows.
We show however that companies in the sector which seek to grow or sustain earnings
are forced to replace consumed reserves by acquiring positions in foreign assets. They
do this despite the fact that they are typically only able to acquire minority stakes in
foreign assets - effectively relegating them to the position of junior partner in the assets.
Like Rose (1996), who examines the apparently contradictory behavior of banks, we
seek to examine and understand the contradictory behavior of O&G companies that
acquire minority stakes in international assets.
Ownership ebbs and flows in international diversification have been well documented
through studies examining the value of pay off (Berger and Ofek 1995; Comment and
Jarrell 1995; Laeven and Levine 2007; Singh et al. 2003) and the the beneficial effect of
geographic diversification on risk reduction by Rose (1996), but without due regard to
the effects of diversification on asset control. Our resource sector study is characterized
by two notable attributes that enable us to clearly identify the effect of diversification
on asset control: the location of reserves enables us to isolate asset ownership structure
by country; secondly, oil and gas are homogenous and non-renewable (Stiglitz 2007),
enabling a global comparison of ownership. These attributes of location and homogene-
ity enable us to limit endogeneity and isolate country specific effects of international
globalization on corporate assets.
Despite the above insights, the strategic resource extractive industry is neither effi-
cient nor transparent in its market structure for oilfield assets. We know little about
the ownership of these assets nor is there much research into these closely held as-
sets. To complicate matters the sector is often subject to political, fiscal, and economic
protectionism as companies seek control of the assets needed to sustain earnings (see
Kretzschmar and Kirchner (2008)). The largest and most important oil and gas reserves
are state owned, directly limiting corporate access to these (Victor 2007). Explicit lim-
its to corporate geographic expansion have already been observed in the O&G sector
with numerous host countries (Non OECD in particular) tend to retain control over
domestic assets through national oil companies (Victor 2007). As result, corporates
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compete for the balance of field assets in these countries (Krezschmar et al. 2009).
Hence while we measure the average majority stake by company grouping, it is clear
that NOCs dominate domestic holdings with an average of 57.59% of domestic fields.
Because these NOCs control large fields they actually control 94.18% of domestic re-
serves. The main focus in this paper is therefore on the extent to which companies are
able to attain control over non NOC oilfield cash flows, by gaining asset blockholdings
greater than 25%. The 25% blockholding cut off we use in this paper is informed by
the generally accepted industry practice that enables the operator involvement in the
operation of the field.
Detailed global oilfield asset ownership data enable us to analyze the percentage of
reserves owned outside the country of company’s primary operation. Ownership of
physical reserves entitles companies to oil revenues in proportion to their holdings in
the field (see Errunza and Senbet (1984)). We perform an extended empirical analysis
of international diversification effects on ownership and document that diversification is
directly related to a reduction of control on internationally diversified assets. Domestic
reserve holdings exceed foreign holdings, comprising 64.3% of company reserves owned,
with the balance held in foreign reserves. This domestic bias is especially pronounced
for NOCs, which own 94.2% of their physical reserve assets in their home countries. In
contrast, we show that only 10.5% of the reserves owned by oil majors are domestic
while 89.5% are foreign, a preponderance of foreign asset exposure that makes clear
the extent of the globalization necessary for the largest oil and gas companies seeking
reserve replacement.
Furthermore, we demonstrate that company control over domestic oil and gas assets
exceeds that for foreign oilfield assets. Even the largest listed oil companies, oil majors,
own on average 49.8% in domestic reserve assets but own on average only 35.6% in
foreign fields. Listed NOCs on average own 57.6% of domestic fields and only 30.6%
in foreign oilfields. Findings highlight the loss of oil field cash flow control that occurs
with international diversification. Yet, despite the diminishing control over foreign
oilfield cash-flows, diversifying companies seek to retain minimum blockholdings in
their foreign assets. We show that 25.5% of domestic assets and even higher 32.6% of
foreign assets are held in blockholdings. This trend is particularly pronounced for large
cap majors for which 44.91% of foreign holdings are blockholdings vs only 10.18% of
domestic reserve block holdings.
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In conclusion, diversification in the oil and gas sector comes at an important and
hitherto unmeasured cost, the loss of control over strategically important resource as-
sets. Global insights demonstrate that control over asset cash flows commensurate to
percentage stakes in oilfield assets diminishes with increasing geographic diversifica-
tion, an outcome that stems primarily from new entrants inability to compete against
host National Oil Companies. Importantly, we note that there is a lower limit to the
oilfield asset ownership loss that diversifying companies are prepared to tolerate. This
is reflected in the retention of minimum blockholdings (above 25%) in foreign oilfield
assets.
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II Data and Key Concepts
Our definitions of ownership rely on the sector principle that majority stake (or at
least a minimum blockholding) is required to exercise control over oilfield cash flow,
with majority stakeholders determining oilfield strategy and therefore NPV profile.
Ownership attributable to cash flow rights has previously been emphasized in studies
by Faccio and Lang (2002) and Holderness (2007). For the O&G industry, ownership
of cash flows is commensurate to ownership in the field, but with blockholdings able
to determine asset strategy. In this study Ownership therefore is measured as the
percentage of remaining reserves attributable to company’s holding. We therefore use
percentage ownership and percentage stake terms interchangeably. A majority stake is
defined as 50% ownership of the oilfield, while blockholdings are measured as 25% field
ownership.
We analyze ownership in these categories for the three main groups of owners, na-
tional oil companies, large cap majors, and North American and international inde-
pendents (NAII). A national oil company is defined as a company, joint venture or
organization owned by a government (Hartley and Medlock 2008), an large cap major
category includes the 12 large cap integrated oil companies, engaged in the upstream
O&G sector, as well as at least one other significant activity in the downstream sector
and which are also classified as oil majors by the Society of Petroleum Engineers.1 Com-
panies that are not in the above categories are included in NAII category. Companies
that are not publicly listed are not included in the study. This ensures that NOCs like
Saudi Aramco, Emirates National Oil company seeking to maximize economic rents
from domestic reserves do not bias the results of the study (Stiglitz 2007).
Global reserve and ownership data as at January 2008 are hand-collected and updated
quarterly by specialist research teams through interviews with operating companies.2
Global reserve data reflect the size of the remaining reserves of the fields and their
ownership structures as year-end 2007. For example, as at 2007 the oil major Total
owns a total of 364 stakes in oilfields globally with 34,866 million barrels of oil equivalent
in physical reserves attributable to all stakes combined. We examine asset ownership
of each company in the dataset. For example, if a company X owns 60% of company Y,
112 oil majors include BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, ENI, ExxonMobil, Hess, Marathon, Murphy
Oil, Occidental, Petro Canada, Shell and Total
2Reserve and reserve ownership data are commercially available from the Energy Research House
Wood Mackenzie
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which in turn owns 30% of field Z, then we calculate that company X owns 18% of field
Z. Using an example from the dataset, Repsol-YPF owns 66% of company Pluspetrol,
which owns 55% of Block 1-AB field in Peru, we posit that Repsol-YPF owns 36.3%
of field Block 1-AB. Our study uses only material oil field assets with a minimum of
5 million barrels of oil equivalent (mmboe) in remaining reserves. This lower limit to
asset size enables us to overcome idiosyncracies associated with small oilfield assets
previously identified by Kretzschmar and Moles (2006).
Table I presents the summary of reserve holdings across seven regions identified in
this study owned by the listed oil and gas companies included in this study.
[Table I about here.]
With reference to Table I we start with a total population of 2,181 oil and gas companies
owning a total of 8911 oilfields which account for 100% of global reserves and then use
several filters to construct the dataset we use for this study. We select only listed firms
to be included in our study and remove all private NOCs (which own a sizable majority
of global reserves in the oil and gas sector) and other private unlisted oil and gas firms.
Listed companies own a total of 6,633 stakes in oilfields worldwide comprising 902,983
mmboe of physical reserves, which account for 35% of world’s total reserves (see Table
I).
For the final dataset of 293 publicly listed firms market data and geography of pri-
mary listing are collected from Thomson Financial Datastream. We use market data
for the year-end closest to December 31, 2007. We split reserve location into seven
geographic oil producing regions where companies own oilfield assets: Africa, North
America, South/Central America, Asia Pacific, Eurasia, Europe, and Middle East.
This geographic segmentation into proximate regions allows us to measure the extent
of company’s international diversification based on the number of different regions
where companies own oilfield assets. This global geographic metric is included in the
variable description in Table IV.
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A Data Analysis - Domestic and Foreign Ownership
In Table II we compare ownership characteristics between foreign and domestic asset
holdings for the complete dataset of listed O&G companies and for the three company
groupings (NOCs, Large Cap Majors, NAII ). Domestic reserves include reserves owned
in the country of primary listing, whereas foreign reserves encompass ownership outside
the country of primary listing. To capture the effect of economies of scale from operating
large fields, we distinguish domestic and foreign involvement for large fields. Large
fields in this study contain in excess of 60 million barrels of oil equivalent in remaining
reserves. Differentiating between large fields and total ownership allows us to identify
economies of scale as a separate explanatory variable used in the regression analysis
and defined in Table IV. We adopt an analysis of blockholdings consistent with the
ownership study by Holderness (2007). Ownership stakes are classified as blockholdings
when ownership in a particular field exceeds 25% threshold.
[Table II about here.]
Figure 1a illustrates the percentage of reserves attributable to domestic and foreign
reserve holdings. Figure 1b summarizes the average ownership in domestic and foreign
oilfields calculated from the average stake size for each company in foreign and domestic
fields. Figure 1c presents the proportion of reserves held in blockholdings, calculated
as the number of blockholdings divided by the number of all oilfield stakes held by each
company grouping and for the whole dataset. Data are interpreted below. From Table
II and Figure 1a we observe that based on proportion of reserves held by all listed O&G
companies, domestically owned reserves dominate foreign reserves. Domestic reserves
comprise 64.3% of total reserves owned, with the balance encompassing foreign reserve
holdings. This finding is particularly pronounced for NOCs, for which domestic reserves
comprise 94.2% of the total reserves owned by NOCs. In contrast, only 10.5% of
reserves owned by large cap majors are domestic and the remaining 89.5% are foreign,
suggesting that the ownership structures for the 89.5% of foreign reserves is of critical
and strategic importance.
[Figure 1 about here.]
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With reference to Table II we find that across all listed companies average owner-
ship in domestic and foreign assets is about the same. This equality in the average
ownership stakes for the whole dataset is explained by the large number of NAII O&G
companies dominating the dataset and for which average ownership stake size holds
across domestic and foreign oilfields. By contrast, there is clear evidence illustrated in
Figure 1b that NOCs reduce their average ownership stakes from 57.6% in domestic
fields to 30.6% in foreign assets. Similarly, largest listed companies, large cap majors,
are able to own on average 49.8% in domestic reserve assets and only 35.6% in foreign
fields. Data for both company groupings suggest control over assets diminishes as a
direct result of international diversification.
From Table II, the decline in ownership is particularly pronounced for average own-
ership in large foreign fields vs large domestic fields. The number of stakes in large
fields on the contrary increases from domestic to foreign operations, suggesting that
companies try to gain access to economies of scale derived from operating large fields;
however, fierce NOC competition for large fields does not allow large ownership stakes
in foreign markets.
Despite the dimunition in ownership of foreign assets, diversified listed companies
strive to retain a minimum blockholding (25%) in international assets. Table II and
Figure 1c demonstrate that companies have more blockholdings outside the country of
primary listing compared to blockholdings in domestic oil field assets. This characteris-
tic is most pronounced for large cap majors for which 44.9% of the ownership stakes are
foreign blockholdings and only 10.2% are domestic blockholdings. For the population
of listed oil and gas companies 32.6% of their foreign reserve holdings are blockholdings
vs 25.5% of domestic blockholdings. The exception is demonstrated by NOCs, which
enjoy privileged position in domestic markets resulting in majority, 64.9%, of all stakes
owned by NOCs being blockholdings of domestic assets and only 14.4% blockholdings
of foreign reserves.
B Diversification, Size, and Cash-flow Ownership
We seek to investigate the link between firm’s geographic diversification, market size
and control over its assets. Existing research uses different ways of measuring geo-
graphic diversification, we follow Rose (1996) and use a regional diversification mea-
sure, which simply counts the number of regions where the company owns oilfield assets.
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We split companies into seven diversification bands according to the number of regions
across which assets are diversified based on geographic proximity of the regions. Where
one region signifies undiversified firm and seven regions reflect maximum level of ge-
ographic diversification. Table III presents the summary of company characteristics
arranged according to the diversification bands.
Variables listed along the horizontal axis of Table III are split into three main cate-
gories, testing international diversification, size and reserve ownership structure. Previ-
ous studies have suggested multiple ways of measuring the degree internationalization,
examples of most complete studies include Christophe and Lee (2001) and Sullivan
(1994), who use percentage of foreign sales as a fraction of total sales, foreign assets
as a percentage of total assets, foreign profit as a percentage of total profit and other
parameters. We use the percentage of foreign reserves as a fraction of total reserves.
Size variables include average physical reserves owned by the companies, economies
of scale and market capitalization (MC). Economies of scale are defined as the number
of stakes owned in large fields divided by the total stakes count. Large fields are defined
to be those in excess of 60 mmboe in remaining reserves.
[Table III about here.]
Table III Panel A summarizes listed companies, indicating a positive interaction be-
tween firm size and level of diversification, suggesting that large companies are more di-
versified. This positive relationship between size and level of diversification is strongest
for the large cap majors. These are found to be diversified across at least three geo-
graphic regions. With reference to Table III the majority of all companies in the study
are not diversified and own assets in a single region. Of 184 undiversified companies 180
are NAII, which include predominantly smaller cap independent oil and gas companies
lacking financial resources to access foreign reserves. Similarly, for NAII summarized in
Panel D of table III, the level of diversification also increases with size. The anomaly to
this pattern is NOCs, which show no apparent linear relationship between geographic
diversification and firm size (see Appendix VII for the details on regional diversification
and firm level characteristics for each NOC). The reason for this anomaly is clear; if a
country has large reserves its NOC is large as well.
All listed companies demonstrate decreasing control over oilfield assets with a re-
duction in average stake size with the average stake size of 43.6% for undiversified
companies and lower 34.9% average stake size for highly diversified companies. Table
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III illustrates that overall the relationship between diversification and asset control is
strong for NAII and less for large cap majors. In Panel D of Table III the two compa-
nies diversified across all seven geographic regions in the NAII grouping deviate from
this trend. These extreme observations are driven by large ownership stakes held by
two large diversified companies BG and Anadarko. NOCs show no linear relationship
between their level of diversification and asset ownership, an attribute we ascribe to the
precondition of NOCs needing political alliances to enable NOCs’ strategic resource ac-
quisitions in foreign countries. This limitation of foreign entry was recently illustrated
by the failure of the Chinese NOC CNOOC Ltd. effective takeover of the US California
based firm Unocal forcing CNOOC Ltd to withdraw its 18.5 billion US dollar takeover
bid. Washington argued that the deal would threaten US national security and violate
the rules of fairtrade.3
From Table III we also observe the diminishing ability of large cap majors to access
large foreign fields concurrent with increasing diversification. Table III shows that
100% of all stakes owned by least diversified large cap majors are held in large fields
compared to only 78% of the stakes being in large fields for most diversified companies
suggesting the decreasing economies of scale from diversification. This limitation to
corporate access of large fields is perhaps explained by greater host country NOC
awareness of the need to retain ownership of economic rents for strategically important
assets, limiting opportunities for globalizing companies.
In summary, our data analysis shows limited evidence of a positive relationship be-
tween firm size and level of diversification and a negative relationship with asset control.
3Washington Post
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IV Regression Analysis
1 Regression Model
We formulate a framework based on ordinary least squares (OLS) procedures to pro-
vide industry wide insights into the effect of diversification on asset control. Specifically,
we construct two cross-sectional models to investigate the manner in which ownership
structures vary across undiversified companies focused on a single region and interna-
tionally diversified firms. Using a combination of asset ownership characteristics con-
sistent with prior corporate ownership studies by La Porta et al. (1999), we contruct
two linear regressions of the form:
Model 1: %Ownership = α +
5∑
i=1
βiXi; (1)
Model 2: %Blockholding = α +
5∑
i=1
βiXi; (2)
where X1 is the Number of regions, X2 is the %Foreign reserves, X3 is Ln(Reserves),
X4 is Economies of scale, X5 is Ln(MC).
Consistent with the metrics we use in descriptive data analysis, the first measure
reflects the average percentage of ownership in oilfield assets for each company and
is denoted as %Ownership. We also use the number of blockholdings (25%) denoted
as %Blockholding and defined as the ratio of blockholding stakes to the number of all
stakes held by the company. We use logarithmic transformations of reserve size and
market capitalization to mitigate the effect of extreme observations in reserve size and
market capitalization. All remaining explanatory variables are defined consistent with
definitions used in our descriptive data analysis.
All explanatory variables are grouped into two categories to control for diversification
and size. Models 1 and 2 are designed to control for the two categories of explanatory
variables; diversification and size, where Model 1 models average field ownership and
Model 2 explains the blockholding stakes. Table IV provides detailed description of
dependent and explanatory variables. Panel A describes the dependent variables mod-
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eling average ownership and blockholdings, Panels B, and C provide definitions for
explanatory variables isolating diversification and size, respectively.
[Table IV about here.]
Descriptive statistics for dependent and explanatory variables are summarized in
Table V. We do not subdivide all listed companies into NOCs, large cap majors and
NAII because NOCs and large cap majors company groupings do not provide sufficient
numbers of observations to draw statistically meaningful conclusions. We test the
robustness of the regression results by taking the subsets of large and small companies
differentiated by firm market capitaliztion. Large companies include all firms with
equal or above median market capitalization, small firms include remaining companies
with market capitalization below the median. This size split is reflected in the summary
of descriptive statistics for all variables in Table V presented in three different panels
A, B, and C for the whole dataset of listed companies and large and small companies,
respectively.
[Table V about here.]
2 Regression Results
Table VI presents the results of OLS estimated parameters of models 1 and 2 for all
companies in the dataset. Results support the findings highlighted in univariate anal-
ysis (with reference to previously presented Table III) and illustrates the link between
international diversification and deteriorating ownership. Results of OLS estimation
on a subset of large and small companies are included as robustness tests.
[Table VI about here.]
Results presented for Model 1, controlling for diversification and size variables and
modeling %Ownership, we observe a negative significant coefficient for the Number of
regions, suggesting an adverse effect of increasing level of geographic diversification
on average ownership. Contrary to previous observations from descriptive data anal-
ysis, %Foreign reserves has a positive significant loading, perhaps explained by the
sensitivity of the model to extreme observations.
Regression parameters controlling for size are significant at 99% level for both models
when regressed for the whole dataset (see Table VI). Ln(Reserves) captures the size
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of total reserves owned by each company and shows positive relationship with %Own-
ership, suggesting that companies with a large existing reserve base tend to achieve
higher ownership stakes and hence are able to control their assets. The factor loading
for Economies of scale is negative and significant, suggesting that holdings in large
fields are smaller. This is explained by fierce competition for participation in large
fields and protective policies of the states with regard to large strategically important
oil and gas reserves, discussed previously and summarized (see Table II). Consistent
with the descriptive data analysis, Ln(MC), the regression variable controlling for firm
size, has a negative and significant coefficient, demonstrating that the level of diversi-
fication escalates with firm size but leads to the reduction of percentage of ownership
in oilfield assets and therefore diminishing control over the oilfield cash flows. This
finding shows sector evidence in support of the negative interaction between the firm
size and the effect of geographic diversification on asset control.
Results for Model 2, where %Blockholding is regressed against variables identical to
Model 1, all variable coefficients retain their sign and significance levels. The exception
is the coefficient of %Foreign reserves for which significance level declines, suggesting
a weaker relationship between the proportion of companies’ foreign reserve holdings
and field blockholdings. Similar to all previous results we observe negative significant
interaction between the Number of regions and %Blockholding.
For robustness tests to verify our findings for the complete dataset of listed O&G
companies we repeat the OLS procedures using the subsets of small and large companies
sorted by market capitalization and repeat the OLS procedures. In Table VI we find
that results achieved for the complete dataset of companies are robust for the two sub
sets of data. For Model 1 we find strong evidence of a negative relationship between
diversification and ownership, supporting our finding of the effect of diversification on
company’s diminishing control over oilfield assets. Size variables likewise retain their
significance levels. In Model 2 the significance levels for diversification variables decline,
however we still observe negative interaction between diversification and ownership,
measured either by %Ownership or %Blockholding.
The robustness results for a subset of small companies are strong. The exception
is firm size effect, measured by Ln(MC), that loses its significance, suggesting that
for small companies firm size effects are not sufficient to yield statistically significant
results and affect ownership.
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V Conclusion
The spread of international diversification has provided researchers with a puzzling
question: why do large corporations continue to expand internationally if there is im-
plied cost of diversification - a dimunition in control over assets. The results of this
study suggest a possible answer to this research question: reserve replacement and hedg-
ing of political risk. We infer that these positive benefits associated with geographic
expansion are sufficient to offset the loss of control over assets.
Firstly, we document that diversification is directly related to a reduction in own-
ership for diversified assets. Diversified companies are shown to be the largest listed
companies in the oil and gas sector, suggesting a direct link between firm size and level
of international diversification. Secondly, we examine the relationship between upper
ownership limits of foreign assets from finding above with the minimum blockholding
retained by corporates to secure foreign asset ownership. Our study demonstrates that
international diversification comes with the important caveat that diversified companies
strive to retain a minimum ownership blockholdings in international assets.
Interestingly our findings are supported by the fact that companies have more block-
holdings outside the country of primary listing (compared to blockholdings in domestic
oil field assets). This characteristic is again most pronounced for large integrated oil
companies, for which 44.9% of all ownership stakes are foreign blockholdings with only
10.2% in domestic assets. An exception is NOCs, which enjoy privileged position in
domestic markets resulting in majority, 64.9%, of all stakes owned by NOCs being
domestic blockholdings with only 14.4% blockholdings in foreign reserves. This work
provides industry wide evidence of the implied cost of international diversification. We
suggest that future research into the value of diversification will provide rich insights
into the value effects control losses associated with international diversification.
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[Table VII about here.]
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Figure 1. Domestic and foreign reserve ownership and blockholdings at 2007
Figures 1a-1c present a graphical summary of the comparisons of domestic and foreign reserve holdings, average reserve ownership, and
blockholdings. Figure 1a illustrates the percentage of reserves attributable to domestic and foreign reserve holdings. For example, third
set of bars in Figure 1a demonstrates that only 10.5% of the reserves owned by large cap majors are domestic and 89.5% are foreign
reserves. Figure 1b summarizes the average ownership in domestic and foreign oilfields calculated from the average stake size for each
company in foreign and domestic fields. The third set of bars in Figure 1b illustrates that large cap majors ownership on average 49.8%
of the reserves in domestic fields and only 35.6% of the reserves in foreign fields. Figure 1c presents the number of blockholdings as a
proportion of total stakes owned by the companies, demonstrating that blockholdings owned by large cap majors predominantly consist
of foreign blockholdings, which when read together with 1a and 1b suggests that despite the preponderance of foreign reserves, average
ownership is low, but blockholdings are retained.
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Table I Geopolitical Overview of Reserve Ownership
The Table presents the companies’ reserve holdings by geographic region. This study divides world reserves into seven regions including
Africa, North America, South/Central America, Asia Pacific, Eurasia, Europe and Middle East, all listed along the vertical axis in the
table. Oilfield locations are grouped into regions on the basis of geographic proximity. The table differentiates between ‘All companies’
and ‘Listed companies’, which are included in the study. We present total number of companies, reserve ownership in mmboe and as
a percentage of global reserves for all O&G companies and only listed O&G companies. Subsidiaries’ reserves are consolidated with
parent companies and companies with no reserves are excluded from ownership analysis. Listed companies own 35% of global reserves,
the remaining 65% are controlled by unlisted National Oil Companies which do not disclose reserve and market data. Number of fields
presented for ‘All companies’ reflects the total number of oil fields above 5 mmboe globally, where the number of stakes for ‘All Listed
Companies’ reflects the number of oil field stakes owned by listed companies, which does not reconcile to the number of distinct oilfields.
Ownership reflects the percentage of remaining reserves listed company owns in a given field.
Region All Companies Ownership Listed Companies Ownership
N Reserves Fields N Reserves Stakes Ownership
(mmboe) % Global
Reserves
N (mmboe) % Global
Reserves
N %
Global 2181 2575743 100% 8911 337 902982.5 35.06% 6633 42.93%
1 Africa 474 175830.9 6.8% 1977 3 76103.17 2.95% 1428 39.39%
2 North America 355 132383.8 5.1% 1184 183 127300.9 4.94% 1155 17.40%
3 South/Central America 248 426379.4 16.6% 913 3 56455.36 2.19% 470 40.67%
4 Asia Pacific 331 88025.81 3.4% 1171 64 65813.35 2.56% 990 34.07%
5 Eurasia 351 662963.3 25.7% 1926 19 485665.9 18.86% 1071 61.87%
6 Europe 275 58326.01 2.3% 1058 59 35175.35 1.37% 926 44.42%
7 Middle East 147 1031834 40.1% 682 6 47479.4 1.84% 218 50.47%
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Table II Domestic and Foreign Acquisitions and Reserve Ownership
The table presents the summary of reserve ownership grouped into total, domestic and foreign reserves and differentiated by company
type. We demonstrate the comparative summary of domestic and foreign reserves owned by the companies: physical reserves attributable
to companies’ holdings globally, domestic by primary listing and foreign, outside of home country. Reserves reflect physical reserves in
mmboe and percentage of domestic and foreign reserves relative to reserves owned globally. Ownership reflects the average ownership
across all fields owned by the companies; ownership in large fields reflects average ownership in fields that by definition of large
fields exceed 60 mmboe in remaining reserves; number of stakes reflects total count of stakes owned by the companies; number
of stakes in large fields in absolute and percentage terms as a fraction of total number of stakes attributable to the companies.
Blockholdings reflect the number of stakes which own in excess of 25% of the field. %Blockholdings reflects the number of blockholding
stakes as a fraction of the total number of stakes owned by the company. All variables are grouped according to company groupings,
including a summary for all listed companies, National Oil Companies, large cap majors and North American and International Independents.
Listed Companies Listed NOCs Large Cap Majors NAII
Total Dom Foreign Total Dom Foreign Total Dom Foreign Total Dom Foreign
Reserves (mmboe) 902983 580264 322718 444649 418785 25864 258713 27247 231465 199621 134232 65390
% of Global holdings 64.26% 35.74% 94.18% 5.82% 10.53% 89.47% 67.24% 32.76%
%Ownership 40.69% 41.69% 39.52% 42.71% 57.59% 30.59% 36.70% 49.76% 35.63% 40.72% 39.00% 40.57%
%Ownership (Large fields) 41.13% 48.86% 36.35% 43.36% 54.30% 32.48% 38.40% 43.91% 38.09% 41.07% 48.32% 36.66%
Number of fields 6633 2609 4024 1002 709 293 2534 418 2116 3097 1482 1615
Number of large fields 2248 808 1440 512 363 149 940 116 824 796 329 467
Large fields (%) 33.89% 12.18% 21.71% 51.10% 36.23% 14.87% 37.10% 4.58% 32.52% 25.70% 10.62% 15.08%
Blockholdings 3852 1691 2161 794 650 144 1396 258 1138 1662 783 879
%Blockholdings 58.07% 25.49% 32.58% 79.24% 64.87% 14.37% 55.09% 10.18% 44.91% 53.66% 25.28% 28.38%
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Table III Diversification
The diversification level of 293 companies in the study is measured by the number of regions where the company owns oilfield assets. All
companies are classified into 7 diversification bands. Companies which are not diversified, own assets within a single region, are included
in band 1. Companies which own assets across all seven geographic regions are included in diversification band 7 respectively. Size
category variables listed on the horizontal axis of the table include average physical reserves owned by the companies; scale economies
reflecting the average count of stakes owned in large fields as a proportion of total number of stakes owned by each company, and an
average market capitalization (MC). The table is split into Panels to demonstrate diversification level for all listed companies in the
study in Panel A and for listed NOCs, large cap majors and NAII in Panels B, C, and D, respectively.
Diversification Size Ownership structure
Regions N Companies
N
%Foreign
Reserves
Reserves Economies of
Scale
MC %Ownership %Blockholdings
Panel A: All Listed Companies - 293
1 184 67% 22877 30% 4059309 43.59% 57.59%
2 50 48% 204028 29% 10259710 36.30% 50.87%
3 17 36% 507074 25% 25959168 37.73% 56.15%
4 15 47% 544494 33% 23891408 36.92% 52.73%
5 12 59% 3506427 47% 49880004 38.84% 55.55%
6 6 100% 413637 67% 43387396 30.68% 56.40%
7 9 58% 1427725 16% 183018445 34.99% 57.87%
Panel B: Listed NOCs - 20
1 4 25% 5085 25% 1024510 24.96% 35.12%
2 4 60% 2095745 60% 30710711 38.63% 37.50%
3 3 50% 1446109 50% 56575033 57.79% 71.35%
4 4 48% 137099 48% 21784029 36.16% 49.31%
5 4 41% 10478154 41% 108927672 55.09% 77.25%
6 1 0% 2041549 0% 99035341 36.61% 35.72%
7 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0
Panel C: Large cap majors - 12
1 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0
2 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0
3 1 100% 57231 100% 32335700 35.83% 62.90%
4 2 95% 1052643 95% 44909185 41.09% 68.87%
5 1 94% 64078 94% 16056640 41.33% 42.86%
6 1 96% 35244 96% 32335700 37.22% 59.15%
7 7 78% 1815716 78% 219984019 32.81% 56.14%
Panel D: NAII - 261
1 180 67% 23272 28% 4126749 44.01% 58.09%
2 46 37% 39531 26% 8481362 36.10% 52.03%
3 13 55% 324977 41% 17565629 32.87% 52.12%
4 9 78% 612637 51% 20157404 36.33% 50.66%
5 7 100% 14347 48% 20970389 27.59% 44.97%
6 4 31% 101257 28% 32238333 27.63% 54.73%
7 2 50% 69757 0% 53638936 42.61% 63.91%
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Table IV Variable Definitions
The table illustrates explanatory variables used for linear regressions with OLS estimates on firm level variables, CCAR
and 1-year Φi, and on deal level 1-year Φ̂j .
This table presents the definitions and sources of dependent and explanatory (independent) variables used in this study.
Variable Notation Description
Panel A: Dependent Variables: Ownership structure
%Ownership Percentage ownership in oilfield assets, measure to capture ownership structure similar
to the measures used to study the relationship between the methods of diversification
and ownership structure in Ruiz-Moreno et al. (2007) Source: Wood Mackenzie, own-
ership data as of 2007.
%Blockholding Number of blockholding stakes divided by the number of all stakes owned by the
company. Ownership stake in excess of 25% of the field reserves is classified as block-
holding. Use of blocholding is informed by Holderness (2007) study of ownership.
Source: Wood Mackenzie, ownership data as of 2007.
Panel B: Explanatory Variables: Diversification
Number of regions X1 A regional diversification measure consistent with Rose (1996), which simply counts
the number of regions where the company owns oilfield assets. There is a total of
seven regions the companies can diversify their asset holdings across, grouped on the
basis of geographic proximity. Source: Wood Mackenzie, ownership data as of 2007.
% Foreign reserves X2 Percentage of foreign reserves as a fraction of total reserves owned by the company.
Variable isolates the contribution from assets outside of country of primary listing;
Rose (1996) uses percentage of foreign assets; Singh et al. (2003) use foreign sales/total
sales to capture similar effects. Source: Wood Mackenzie, ownership data as of 2007.
Panel C: Explanatory Variables: Size
Ln (Reserves) X3 The natural logarithm of each company’s total reserves We use natural logarithm to
mitigate the effect of extreme observations in reserve size. Source: Wood Mackenzie,
ownership data as of 2007.
Economies of scale X4 Number of stakes owned in large fields divided by the total stakes count owned by the
company. Large fields include oil and gas fields in excess 60 mmboe. Source: Wood
Mackenzie, ownership data as of 2007.
Ln (MC) X5 The natural logarithm of each company’s market capitalization (millions USD) to
isolate firm size effect. Source: Thomson Financial Datastream.
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Table V Descriptive statistics - Dependent and explanatory variables
Table V reports descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables used in the models for 293 listed oil companies. The
table differentiates between dependent and explanatory variables, where explanatory variables are grouped into diversification and size
variables. Both dependent variables including %Ownership and %Blockholding reflect ownership data. %Ownership reflects the average
percentage participation in oilfield assets by each company. Percentage of blockholding is calculated by the ratio of blockholding stakes
to the total number of stakes that the company owns. The company is a blockholder when it owns more than 25% of a field. Number of
regions is used to measure the level of geographic diversification. % Foreign reserves is another variable used in the model to isolate asset
ownership outside of host country according to company’s primary listing. Ln(Reserves) captures asset size, Economies of scale enables
us to isolate ownership in large fields and reflects the number of stakes in large oilfields as a fraction of total number of stakes for each
company. Ln(MC) captures firm size of the listed companies (by market capitalization). Additionally, market capitalization allows us to
split the population of listed companies into large and small companies, where large companies are defined to be listed O&G companies
with market capitalization above the median for the whole population of companies in the study.
Dependent Variables Explanatory Variables
Ownership structure Diversification Size
%Ownership %Blockholding Number of % Foreign Ln(Res) Economies Ln(MC)
regions reserves of Scale
Panel A: All listed companies
Mean 41% 56% 2 61% 4.554328 31% 14.01
Median 34% 59% 1 96% 4.312067 25% 13.89
Minimum 0% 0% 1 0% -1.87568 0% 4.25
Maximum 100% 100% 7 100% 12.52834 100% 20.05
StDev 28% 38% 2 46% 2.6966 33% 2.57
N 293 293 293 293 293 293 293
Panel B: Large companies [MC ≥ Median(MC)]
Mean 38% 52% 3 61% 5.99 0.37 16.13
Median 33% 51% 2 91% 6.05 0.33 15.93
Minimum 1% 0% 1 0% -1.08 0.00 13.95
Maximum 100% 100% 7 100% 12.53 1.00 20.05
StDev 26% 34% 2 44% 2.74 0.30 1.47
N 146 146 146 146 146 146 146
Panel B: Small companies [MC < Median(MC)]
Mean 43% 60% 1 61% 3.13 0.25 11.90
Median 35% 67% 1 100% 3.36 0.00 12.28
Minimum 0% 0% 1 0% -1.88 0.00 4.25
Maximum 100% 100% 4 100% 6.80 1.00 13.89
StDev 30% 41% 0 47% 1.73 0.36 1.41
N 147 147 147 147 147 147 147
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Table VI Linear Regressions Analysis - Control
This table reports the estimated coefficients and associated test statistics (in parentheses) of linear regression with OLS estimators of the
following form:
Model 1: %Ownership = α +
∑5
i=1 βiXi
Model 2: %Blockholding = α +
∑5
i=1 βiXi
(3)
The explanatory variables include the number of regions where the company owns reserves; %Foreign Reserves as a fraction of total
reserves owned by the company. Ln(Reserves) is the natural log of total reserves attributable to company’s stake holdings. Economies
of scale is the count of stakes in large fields as a proportion of total stakes owned. Ln(MC) is the natural log of market capitalization.
Parameter significance at a 90%, 95% and 99% levels are indicated are indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively.
Linear Regression All Listed companies Large companies Small companies
[MC ≥ Median(MC)] [MC < Median(MC)]
OLS Estimates Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 0.603*** 0.975*** 0.871*** 1.299*** 0.317 0.643**
(6.127) (7.343) (3.319) (3.899) (1.617) (2.269)
Diversification X1 -0.076*** -0.069*** -0.039*** -0.033 -0.196*** -0.194***
(-5.403) (-3.647) (-2.397) (-1.582) (-3.884) (-2.670)
%Foreign reserves X2 0.079** 0.087* 0.026 0.043 0.088* 0.092
(2.204) (1.820) (0.493) (0.639) (1.835) (1.333)
Ln(Reserves) X3 0.081*** 0.105*** 0.067*** 0.094*** 0.099*** 0.117***
(8.817) (8.447) (5.910) (6.501) (6.350) (5.236)
Economies of scale X4 -0.148*** -0.213*** -0.057 -0.168* -0.233*** -0.262***
(-2.969) (-3.171) (-0.815) (-1.888) (-3.384) (-2.628)
Ln(MC) X5 -0.030*** -0.054*** -0.049*** -0.076*** 0.003 -0.015
(-3.548) (-4.646) (-2.658) (-3.251) (0.195) (-0.587)
R sq 0.22 0.20 0.227 0.269 0.296 0.196
Adj R sq 0.21 0.19 0.199 0.242 0.271 0.167
N 293 293 143 143 147 147
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Table VII Reserve Ownership and Financial Ratios: NOCs
This table presents the diversification level of 20 NOCs in the study, measured by the number of regions where the company owns oilfield
assets. Reserve holdings reflect the amount of remaining physical reserves attributable to each company’s field holdings. We use 7
regions to measure the geographic spread of the reserve holdings. Companies are classified into 7 diversification bands. Companies which
are not diversified, own assets within a single region. Companies which own assets across all seven geographic regions are included in
diversification band 7 respectively. We also include the average ownership percentage for the companies across all field holdings for that
company. %Blockholdings is defined as the number of blockholdings as a percentage of all stakes owned by the company. We also list the
market capitalization of the NOC in million USD.
NOC Reserve holdings Regions %Ownership % Blockholding Capitalization
N
Pakistan Oilfields 1,580.76 1 37.44% 57.14% 1033362
Lion Energy 0.31 1 2.50% 0.00% 9582
Pakistan Petroleum† 18,587.33 1 49.89% 83.33% 2976577
PNOC 172.62 1 10.00% 0.00% 78519
Hellenic Petroleum 613.88 2 41.82% 27.27% 5027066
Indian Oil Corporation 22.43 2 18.75% 0.00% 10736378
Rosneft 8,382,003.61 2 76.10% 97.73% 101404161
GAIL India 338.70 2 17.86% 25.00% 5675237
PTTEP 94,931.10 3 45.22% 56.00% 18238664
Petrobras 4,219,644.03 3 81.55% 93.33% 149719337
Petronas 23,750.96 3 46.59% 64.71% 1767097
CNPC (Hong Kong) 509.17 4 26.15% 33.33% 3098802
CNOOC Ltd 545,315.50 4 72.75% 93.90% 75409738
JAPEX 2,101.70 4 20.88% 20.00% 4282103
SINOCHEM 467.89 4 24.87% 50.00% 4345474
ONGC 542,246.13 5 49.13% 64.86% 43205452
Gazprom 4.00E+07 5 82.51% 98.93% 333559400
Sinopec 252,476.54 5 44.50% 79.63% 23733799
PetroChina 1,161,067.77 5 44.23% 65.57% 35212036
StatoilHydro 2,041,549.00 6 36.32% 60.32% 99035341
†Pakistan Petroleum does not disclose its financial data, however, we include the company in the analysis as reserve ownership data is
commercially available
